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NOTE
PEOPLE V. SANDERS: TOWARDS A UNIFIED POLICY
PROTECTING THE RIGHTS OF JUVENILES
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2003, an experienced police officer cruised slowly through an
urban neighborhood. As he made his way down the street, he saw
Reginold, a man familiar to him from a recent narcotics arrest. The
timing of that earlier arrest suggested Reginold was probably still on
probation. The officer also suspected the man was high on drugs, but
nevertheless, passed him by.
A block later the same officer spotted Earnest, a juvenile whom he
recognized from an earlier arrest. The officer wondered if Earnest
was still on probation. He did not know for sure, but it did not matter.
The officer pulled over adjacent to the curb and ordered Earnest to
come to him. In a swift movement the officer pushed Earnest over the
hood of the patrol car, splayed his feet wide, and frisked him. The of-
ficer removed an item from the juvenile's pocket, which was later
identified as a bag of marijuana.
Unlike his encounter with Reginold, the officer needed neither
probable cause nor reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk Earnest, as
long as Earnest was on probation at the time of the stop and thereby
subject to a search waiver.' In the case of juveniles, a police officer
performing a search does not need to know at the time of the search
whether the juvenile is subject to such a search waiver.' Thus, if the
officer later discovers that Earnest is on probation, the search is valid,
and any evidence found as a result of the search can be used against
him.' Using this procedure, California is the only state in the nation
1. See In re Tyrel J., 876 P.2d 519, 529 (Cal. 1994).
2. Id. at 530.
3. See id.
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that allows an illegal search of a juvenile, which if conducted on an
adult, would result in the suppression of the evidence.
In opposition to California's current law, this note proposes that
the rule articulated in People v. Sanders,5 where the reasonableness of
a search is determined by the circumstances known to the police offi-
cer at the time the search is conducted, 6 should be extended to all pro-
bationers, juveniles and adults alike. In Sanders, the California Su-
preme Court held that an otherwise unlawful search of an adult may
not be later justified by the existence of a search condition of which
the law enforcement officers were unaware when the search was con-
ducted.7
Sanders is not remarkable for this holding; in fact, the rule that the
police cannot legitimize illegal searches by relying on search condi-
tions of which they were then unaware has been universally accepted
for decades.8 The reasons for this rule arise from the Fourth Amend-
ment itself. "[T]he reasonableness of a search is determined by as-
sessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an indi-
vidual's privacy and, on the other, the degree to which [such
intrusion] is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental in-
terests." 9
In the case of an illegal search, however, governmental interests
evaporate unless the police officer conducting the search is then aware
of a search condition that legitimizes his actions on behalf of the
state.10 In fact, Sanders is extraordinary to the extent to which it di-
verged from In re Tyrell J.,11 an infamous decision rendered by the
same court nine years earlier. In Tyrell J. the court made an abrupt
shift away from accepted Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 2 In that
case, police conducted a search of a juvenile at a high school football
4. People v. Sanders, 73 P.3d 496, 503 (Cal. 2003). "As the dissent in Tyrell J. aptly
noted, that strange conclusion, without precedent in any jurisdiction, gives police an incentive
to make searches even without probable cause because, should it turn out that the suspect is a
probationer, the evidence will be admissible nonetheless." Id.
5. Id. at 496.
6. Id. at 507, 514 (Baxter, J., dissenting).
7. Id. at 507.
8. See In re Martinez, 463 P.2d 734, 738 (Cal. 1970).
9. United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118-19 (2001).
10. "But if an officer is unaware that a suspect is on probation and subject to a search
condition, the search is not justified by the state's interest in supervising probationers or by
the concern that probationers are more likely to commit criminal acts." Sanders, 73 P.3d at
507.
11. 876 P.2d 519 (Cal. 1994).
12. Id. at 531-32.
460 [Vol. 41
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game. 3 The search revealed contraband, which was used against the
young man to declare him a ward of the court. 14 At the time of the
search, the police officer had neither reasonable suspicion to support
the search, nor was he aware of the juvenile's probationary search
condition. 5 The California Supreme Court upheld the juvenile's con-
viction, holding that a juvenile subject to a search condition has no
reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment, even
from intrusions by police officers unaware of the search condition. 16
The court's controversial decision in Tyrell J. received over-
whelming negative reactions from legal critics and juvenile advo-
cates. 7 Sanders extended the criticism, with one justice calling the
Tyrell J. outcome "constitutionally suspect,"'" but then, hidden in a
footnote, the majority failed to completely overturn Tyrell J. 9
This note discusses the inequities resulting from this unfair treat-
ment of juveniles under California law. In Part II, the note explores
the existing law as it relates to adults, then to juveniles. Part III ana-
lyzes the Fourth Amendment argument for extending Sanders to cover
juveniles. In Part IV, the note synthesizes Sanders and United States
v. Knights,20 and concludes that Knights mandates the extension of
Sanders to cover juveniles. Part V argues that the failure to extend
Sanders to juveniles triggers a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, under both strict scrutiny and,
alternatively, under a rational basis analysis. Finally, Part VI will
conclude that the unequal treatment of adult and juvenile probationers
is insupportable, and the California Supreme Court or legislature
should extend Sanders to juveniles as soon as the opportunity arises.
13. Id. at 521.
14. Declaring a juvenile a ward of the court is the equivalent of an adult conviction. Id.
at 522.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 529.
17. "[T]he holding opens the door to condoning, and possibly encouraging, police mis-
conduct." Kristin Anne Joyce, Comment, Fourth Amendment Protections for the Juvenile
Probationer After In re Tyrell J., 36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 865, 883 (1996). "In a seemingly
result-oriented opinion, the court evinced both a disregard for precedent and the Fourth
Amendment." Lidia Stiglich, Comment, Fourth Amendment Protection for Juvenile Proba-
tioners in California, Slim or None?: In re Tyrell J., 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 893, 905
(1995).
18. People v. Sanders, 73 P.3d 496,511 (Cal. 2003) (Brown, J., concurring).
19. Id. at 508 n.5.
20. 534 U.S. 112 (2001).
2005]
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II. BACKGROUND LAW
A. Existing Federal Law as It Pertains to Adults
The Fourth Amendment guarantees "[t]he right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreason-
able searches and seizures" by police officers and other government
officials.2 The reasonableness of a search is determined by compar-
ing the degree to which the search intrudes upon an individual's pri-
vacy with the degree to which it is needed to promote legitimate gov-
ernment interests.2 If this determination results in favor of a criminal
defendant, the Fourth Amendment is enforced by an exclusionary rule,
which generally prohibits admission at trial of evidence obtained dur-
ing an illegal search. 23 This exclusionary rule was adopted to effectu-
ate the Fourth Amendment right of "all citizens to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures."'
Thus, the Fourth Amendment prohibits all unreasonable searches
and seizures, and warrantless searches are always unreasonable sub-
ject only to a small number of "specifically established and well-
delineated exceptions." 25 Furthermore, in a criminal prosecution, the
state bears the burden of justifying a warrantless search under such an
exception.26
The United States Supreme Court recognizes such exceptions
when so called "special needs" exist.27 If circumstances render the
warrant and probable cause requirements impracticable, the govern-
ment is allowed to circumvent them if the government's needs are
seen to outweigh the rights of the individual. 8
The "special needs" exception was examined with an eye toward
the constitutionality of search conditions, twice by the U.S. Supreme
Court: first in Griffin v. Wisconsin29 and again in United States v.
21. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
22. United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118-19 (2001).
23. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654-55 (1961); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897,
913 (1984).
24. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974) (citing Weeks v. United States,
232 U.S. 383 (1914)) (emphasis added).
25. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978).
26. See Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 749-50 (1984).
27. Id. at 750.
28. Id. at 747-48.
29. 483 U.S. 868 (1987).
462 [Vol. 41
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Knights.3" In the former, the warrantless search of a probationer in his
home was upheld.31 Petitioner was on probation and subject to a
search condition that permitted any probation officer to search a pro-
bationer's home so long as the officer's supervisor approved, and
there were reasonable grounds to believe the probationer was in pos-
session of contraband prohibited by his probationary status.32 The
probation officer knew of Griffin's probationary status at the time the
search was conducted, and was investigating pursuant to a tip from a
police detective, which specifically identified Griffin as likely to be in
possession of contraband. 3 The Supreme Court upheld the search,
ruling that warrantless searches were reasonable whenever the state
had a "special need[], beyond the normal need for law enforcement,
[to] make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impractica-
ble."' 34 The state's operation of a probation system presents a special
need, necessitating a reduction of Fourth Amendment protections in
order to better supervise probationers.35 In dicta, the court added that
the permissible degree of those reductions was not unlimited.36
Under Knights, whether the officer had knowledge of the search
condition at the time of the search was essential to weighing the rea-
sonableness of a warrantless search.37 In that case, the court held that
a law enforcement officer investigating criminal conduct could search
the residence of a probationer without a warrant pursuant to a proba-
tion search condition. 38 The officer in Knights knew of the search
condition. 39 The court upheld the search because when examining the
"totality of the circumstances," the probation search condition oper-
ated as a salient circumstance.' While defendant Knight's search
condition significantly diminished his reasonable exception of pri-
vacy, it was clear that the officer's knowledge of that search condition
served to legitimize the search under the state's "special needs" excep-
tion developed in Griffin.
30. 534 U.S. 112 (2001).
31. Id. at 880.
32. Id. at 870-71.
33. Id. at 870.
34. Id. at 873 (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O. 496 U.S. 325 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concur-
ring)).
35. Id. at 873-74.
36. ld. at 875.
37. United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112; 121-22 (2001).
38. Id. at 122.
39. Id. at 115.
40. Id. at 118.
2005] 463
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B. Existing California Law as It Pertains to Adults;
Knowledge First Is King
California has previously examined the constitutionality of a war-
rantless search of a residence where police discovered that the suspect
was on parole after the fact. In In re Martinez," Ralph Martinez, an
adult, was arrested while inside his car near his home.42 Police then
conducted a full search of his home without a warrant. 43 At the time
of the search, the officers were unaware of Martinez's parole status. 4
The court held, "[u]nder these circumstances the officers cannot un-
dertake a search without probable cause and then later seek to justify
their actions by relying on the defendant's parole status, a status of
which they were unaware at the time of their search. '4' Reduction of
a parolee's Fourth Amendment protections can be "justified only to
the extent actually necessitated by the legitimate demands of the op-
eration of the parole process," and such demands cannot be justified
when the police officer is unaware that the defendant is on parole. 6
Seventeen years later, this concept was reinforced by the same court in
People v. Bravo47 :
We do not suggest that searches of probationers may be conducted for rea-
sons unrelated to the rehabilitative and reformative purposes of probation
or other legitimate law enforcement purposes. A waiver of Fourth
Amendment rights as a condition of probation does not permit searches
undertaken for harassment or searches for arbitrary or capricious rea-
sons.
4 8
Finally, in Sanders, the police illegally searched a couple's apart-
ment pursuant to a domestic disturbance report. 49 During the search
police discovered contraband stuffed in a boot inside the bedroom
closet.50 This evidence was later used to convict both defendants of
criminal charges.5' However, it was not discovered until after the
search that one of the defendants Was on parole and thereby subject to
41. 463 P.2d 734 (Cal. 1970).
42. Id. at 736 n.l.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 737-38.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. 738 P.2d 336 (Cal. 1987).
48. Id. at 342 (emphasis added).
49. People v. Sanders, 73 P.3d 496, 499 (Cal. 2003).
50. Id.
51. Id.
[Vol. 41
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a search condition allowing warrantless residential searches.5 2 The de-
fendants pled guilty after the trial court denied their motions to sup-
press. 53 However, the defendants appealed, arguing the search was il-
legal.54 The Supreme Court granted review to decide the narrow
question of whether the search was lawful despite the fact the officers
had no idea the defendant was on parole when the search was con-
ducted.5 5 Affirming the Court of Appeals' decision reversing the con-
viction, the Supreme Court held that an otherwise unlawful search of
an adult may not be later justified by the existence of a search condi-
tion of which the police were unaware at the time of the search.
56
Therefore, the status of parolees and probationers subject to
search conditions was clear.57 A search condition reduced one's rea-
sonable expectation of privacy, but not so much that one could antici-
pate an arbitrary search by a police officer unaware of the search con-
dition.
C. In re Tyrell J.: A Startling Departure;
Existing Law as It Pertains to Juveniles
The California Supreme Court made a startling departure from the
universally accepted- Martinez view and overturned twenty five years
of precedent when it decided Tyrell J.58 In that case the warrantless
search of a juvenile was upheld, even though the officer had no
knowledge of the minor's probationary status. 9 By upholding the ju-
venile's conviction, the California Supreme Court held that a juvenile
subject to a search condition had no reasonable expectation of privacy
under the Fourth Amendment, even from intrusions by police officers
unaware of the condition.' The court based its holding on the "spe-
cial needs" of the juvenile justice system, which under the parens pa-
triae model "embraces a goal of rehabilitating youngsters who have
transgressed the law, a goal that is arguably stronger than in the adult
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 499-500.
56. Id. at 507-08.
57. For the purposes of this discussion, the law treats individuals on probation and indi-
viduals on parole uniformly. This is because search waivers attached to either condition op-
erate in the same manner. See People v. Bravo, 738 P.2d 336 (1987) (involving a defendant
on probation); People v Burgener, 714 P.2d 1251 (1986) (involving a defendant on parole).
58. See In re Tyrell J., 876 P.2d 519, 531-32 (Cal. 1994).
59. See id. at 531-32.
60. Id. at 532.
20051 465
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context."'6' The dichotomy of the holdings in Tyrell J. and Martinez
can only be explained by examining the different treatment juveniles
receive in the eyes of the law.
D. Existing Federal Law as It Pertains to Juveniles:
Constitutional Rights Evolve
Historically, the constitutional rights of juveniles have been con-
strued differently than those of adults. 62 Under the doctrine of parens
patriae, the state acts in a capacity as provider of protection to juve-
niles unable to care for themselves. 63 Generally, juvenile courts were
kept "separate from adult criminal courtrooms"' and such "proceed-
ings were [deemed] civil in nature, not criminal."'65 The purpose of
these measures was to "create a nonadversarial setting in which judges
could act in the best interests of the juveniles who appeared in their
courtrooms."66 However, while the ultimate objective of such policies
was the protection of children's welfare, judges and courts believed
such results could not be achieved if the standard rules of criminal due
process were applied to juvenile proceedings.67
As well-intentioned as this parens patriae model was, it led to
grand violations of juveniles' constitutional rights. "Law enforcement
administration in juvenile ... situations was unremarkable largely be-
cause in the first half of the century it was simply assumed that police
had carte blanche authority to do as they pleased with youth."68 By
the 1960s, the discomfort with the parens patriae model and its lack
of oversight of the juvenile court system reached the Supreme Court
in Kent v. United States.69 In Kent, the Court found that the govern-
mental exercise of parens patriae authority led to procedural arbitrari-
ness on a constitutional scale.7" "There is evidence, in fact, that there
may be grounds for concern that the child receives the worst of both
61. Id. at 530.
62. See SAMUEL M. DAVIS, RIGHTS OF JUVENILES: THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 3-2
(2001).
63. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1144 (8th ed. 2004).
64. JOHN C. WATKINS, JR. THE JUVENILE JUSTICE CENTURY: A SOCIOLEGAL
COMMENTARY ON AMERICAN JUVENILE COURTS 47 (1998).
65. Id.
66. CHRISTOPHER P. MANFREDI, THE SUPREME COURT AND JUVENILE JUSTICE 82 (1998).
67. Id. at 85.
68. WATKINS, supra note 64, at 103.
69. 383 U.S. 541; MARTIN R. GARDNER, UNDERSTANDING JUVENILE LAW 177 (2d. ed.
2003).
70. 383 U.S. at 555; GARDNER, supra note 69, at 178.
466 [Vol. 41
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worlds: that he gets neither the protections accorded to adults nor the
solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated for children."7
Thus, there is historical ambivalence regarding the constitutional
rights of juveniles being limited compared to those of adults.7
This restriction of the constitutional rights of juveniles pivotally
changed course when the United States Supreme Court decided In re
Gault.73 The Gault decision "led to a reexamination of the entire ju-
venile justice system in America," and required a guarantee of consti-
tutional due process rights for all juveniles.74 In Gault, the Court re-
viewed the constitutionality of the commitment of Gerald Gault, then
fifteen years old, to a juvenile detention facility for up to six years for
allegedly making an obscene phone call.75 Gault's commitment was
conducted without any procedural formality.76 He was taken from his
home by the Sheriff while his parents were at work.77 The Sheriff did
not notify Gault's parents that Gault was being taken into custody.78
Gault's participation in the phone call was never factually deter-
mined.79 In overturning the commitment order, the Court concluded
that the juvenile court system had failed to effectively attain its reha-
bilitative goals.8 0 Thus, the Gault Court found the essentials of due
process and fair treatment under the Fourteenth Amendment entitled
juveniles to increased procedural protections.8 Later decisions inter-
preted Gault to apply not only to due process violations, but to viola-
tions of juveniles' Fourth Amendment rights as well.82
71. Kent, 383 U.S. at 556.
72. See MANFREDI, supra note 66, at 82; DAVIS, supra note 62, at 1-4.
73. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
74. Stanford J. Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: A Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REV.
1187,1187(1970).
75. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 8. The same violation, if committed by an adult, would
have caused the adult to incur a maximum of two months in jail or a fine of five to fifty dol-
lars. Id. at 8-9.
76. ld. at 4.
77. Id. at 5.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 6.
80.
The constitutional and theoretical basis for this peculiar system is--to say the
least--debatable. And in practice, as we remarked in the Kent case, supra, the re-
sults have not been entirely satisfactory. Juvenile Court history has again demon-
strated that unbridled discretion, however benevolently motivated, is frequently a
poor substitute for principle and procedure.
Id. at 17-18.
81. Id.at3O-31.
82. "All courts that have specifically considered the question of the applicability of the
[F]ourth [A]mendment to the juvenile process have held in favor of its applicability, or more
9
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Thus, by 1980, when the Joint Commission on Juvenile Justice
Standards of the Institute of Judicial Administration and the American
Bar Association published its model for states to implement in order
to revise their juvenile court systems, its authors concluded that all as-
pects of the Fourth Amendment should apply to juveniles and adults
alike.83 Standard 3.2 of the model recommends:
Police investigation into criminal matters should be similar whether the
suspect is an adult or a juvenile. Juveniles, therefore, should receive at
least the same safeguards available to adults in the criminal justice system.
This should apply to: A. preliminary investigations (e.g., stop and frisk);
B. the arrest process; C. search and seizure; ... [and] F. prehearing deten-
tion and release. 84
The official note to Standard 3.2 effectively renders dead any no-
tion that the parens patrie model should continue to be utilized if it re-
sults in stripping juveniles of their constitutional rights:
Is it not more outrageous for the police to treat children more harshly than
adult offenders, especially when such is violative of due process and fair
treatment? Can a court countenance a system where, as here, an adult may
suppress evidence with the usual effect of having the charges dropped for
lack of proof, and on the other hand, a juvenile can be institutionalized-
lose the most sacred possession a human being has, his freedom-for 're-
habilitative' purposes because the Fourth Amendment right is unavailable
to him?"5
Thus nationwide, courts agree Fourth Amendment protections ap-
ply equally whether the subject is a juvenile or an adult, regardless of
the civil nature of juvenile proceedings.8 6
Ill. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO THE
EXCLUSIONARY RULE
While the Sanders majority relied on the exclusionary rule's de-
terrent value in deciding to suppress the evidence, there are other
compelling reasons why the Fourth Amendment would deem the
search illegal. Those reasons highlight the need to extend the Sanders
rule to cover juveniles.
correctly, no court considering the question has held the [F]ourth [A]mendment to be inappli-
cable tojuvenile proceedings." DAVIS, supra note 62, at 3-17.
83. WATKINS, supra note 64, at 104. 1'
84. JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS 3.2 (Inst. Judicial Admin. 1980) (emphasis added).
85. Id. cmt. introduction.
86. DAVIS, supra note 62, at 3-21.
468 [Vol. 41
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Sanders holds that police cannot justify otherwise illegal searches
through the use of a later discovered search condition.87 The major-
ity's main reason supporting the holding was that it was "consistent
with the primary purpose of the exclusionary rule-to deter police
misconduct."88 This holding follows the reasoning set forth in United
States v. Leon,89 which established the "good faith exception" to the
Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. 90 In Leon, the court held
the exclusionary rule would not apply to cases where police officers
relied in good faith on a warrant that was lacking probable cause. 91
The court reasoned that the deterrence purpose of the exclusionary
rule was only intended for police, and not others involved in criminal
administration.92 The problem with Leon is that it was wrongly de-
cided. The framers of the Constitution and the Fourth Amendment in
particular were not only concerned with unreasonable searches and
seizures by police, but by the government in general.93
That courts tend to state the "primary" purpose of the exclusion-
ary rule is to deter police misconduct is not surprising. Frequent in-
teractions between police and the public present reasons to determine
individuals' rights under the Fourth Amendment. There is danger,
however, in letting the primaty purpose for a rule become misunder-
stood as the sole purpose for that rule. 4 In fact, the exclusionary rule
serves numerous purposes beyond deterring police misconduct. 95
First among these is that the primary purpose of the exclusionary
rule is not to deter police misconduct, but rather to ensure individual' s
rights under the Fourth Amendment are respected. 96 Viewed from this
87. People v. Sanders, 73 P.3d 496, 507 (Cal. 2003).
88.
The requirement that the reasonableness of a search must be determined from the
circumstances known to the officer when the search was conducted is consistent
with the primary purpose of the exclusionary rule-to deter police misconduct.
The rule serves "to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effec-
tively available way-by removing the incentive to disregard it.
Id. (quoting Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961)).
89. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
90. Id. at 923-24.
91. Id. at 926.
92. Id. at 916.
93. Id. at 929-30.
94. See Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
95. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 933-34 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Potter Stewart, The Road to
Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and Future of The Exclusionary Rule
in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1365 (1983).
96.
[T]he purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to safeguard the right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures. Throughout the opinion, the majority in this
4692005]
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perspective, the exclusionary rule only operates as a "judicially cre-
ated remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights gener-
ally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional
right of the party aggrieved." 97 Therefore, examining the presence or
absence of deterrence is improper when conducting a totality of the
circumstances analysis to determine whether one's rights were abused
under the Fourth Amendment, because deterrence pertains only to ap-
plication of the exclusionary rule.98 Whether police violated an indi-
vidual's rights during an illegal search is a separate question, the af-
firmative answer to which will only then trigger exclusion of
evidence. Thus, there are dangers lurking when courts supplant an
analysis of whether to apply the exclusionary rule for whether a per-
son's Fourth Amendment rights were violated during a search. Only
through this logical error was Tyrell J. able to reach its constitution-
ally untenable result, one which should be overturned. 99
Also among the exclusionary rule's more nuanced purposes is that
of ensuring judicial integrity."° The exclusionary rule's value to the
courts is found in the following passage from Justice Brennan's dis-
sent in United States v. Leon:
case refers to the exclusionary rule's goal of deterring unlawful police conduct as
supporting its holding that the search here cannot be justified by a parole search
condition of which the searching officers were ignorant. But that goal is not rele-
vant in determining whether a particular search or seizure violates the Fourth
Amendment, which is the issue here.
People v. Sanders, 73 P.3d 496, 509-10 (Cal. 2003) (Kennard, J., concurring) (emphasis
added) (citations omitted).
97. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974).
98. "The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule is not a consideration in assessing
the totality of the circumstances affecting the reasonableness of a search." Sanders, 73 P.3d
at 511 (Brown, J., concurring).
99.
[T]he fact that deterrence is the primary purpose of the exclusionary rule does not
assist in analyzing the predicate question. Until In re Tyrell J.... this court's
search and seizure jurisprudence was generally consistent with the United States
Supreme Court's view that the purpose of the exclusionary rule was relevant to the
scope of the remedy, not the contours of the constitutional right itself. Both of
these decisions concerned the legality of the officers' conduct, not the appropriate-
ness of excluding the evidence. In Tyrell J., however, the court's analysis for the
first time-perhaps to shore up a constitutionally suspect result--included refer-
ence to the "primary purpose of the Fourth Amendment" as part of its rationale.
Id. (Brown, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
100. "Courts which sit under our Constitution cannot and will not be made party to law-
less invasions of the constitutional rights of citizens by permitting unhindered governmental
use of the fruits of such invasions." Id. at 507. "[C]onviction by means of unlawful seizures
and enforced confessions ... should find no sanction in the judgments of the courts." Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 648 (1961) (quoting Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392
(1914)).
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[T]he [Fourth] Amendment, like other provisions of the Bill of Rights, re-
strains the power of the government as a whole; it does not specify only a
particular agency and exempt all others. The judiciary is responsible, no
less than the executive, for ensuring that constitutional rights are re-
spected.
When that fact is kept in mind, the role of the courts and their possible in-
volvement in the concerns of the Fourth Amendment comes into sharper
focus. Because seizures are executed principally to secure evidence, and
because such evidence generally has utility in our legal system only in the
context of a trial supervised by a judge, it is apparent that the admission of
illegally obtained evidence implicates the same constitutional concerns as
the initial seizure of that evidence. Indeed, by admitting unlawfully seized
evidence, the judiciary becomes a part of what is in fact a single govern-
mental action prohibited by the terms of the Amendment.
101
The courts are the key arbiter of adults' Fourth Amendment
rights, and for this reason the exclusionary rule binds the efforts of the
courts as well as the police. Because the same is true of the juvenile
court system, it should be no less bound by the dictates of the exclu-
sionary rule and its purpose of preserving the integrity of the system
under the Fourth Amendment. Under Tyrell J., however, police are
allowed to conduct illegal searches of juveniles, and to have whatever
evidence they find during those searches admitted at trial. This policy
undermines an important purpose of the exclusionary rule, which is to
preserve the integrity of the justice system. The courts face a difficult
choice: exclude evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment or, by admitting evidence from illegal searches, partake in the
evil by which the evidence was obtained.'0 2 By allowing the latter, the
public, and especially the juveniles subject to such a policy, lose their
trust in the entire justice system. For this reason, Sanders' distinction
between the use of the exclusionary rule with respect to juveniles and
adults should be abolished.
Finally, the exclusionary rule shapes the behavior of government
institutions, not just police departments, in such a way as to ensure
their policies and practices protect the rights of individuals to be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures. "[T]hat our society attaches
101. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 933-934 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
102. Chief Justice Holmes reached the heart of the matter when he wrote:
[Therefore] we must consider the two objects of desire, both of which we cannot
have, and make up our minds which to choose. It is desirable that criminals should
be detected, and to that end that all available evidence should be used. It also is de-
sirable that the Government should not itself foster and pay for other crimes, when
they are the means by which the evidence is to be obtained.
Stewart, supra note 95 at 1382 (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928)
(Holmes, J., dissenting).
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serious consequences to violation of constitutional rights is thought to
encourage those who formulate law enforcement policies, and the of-
ficers who implement them, to incorporate Fourth Amendment ideals
into their value system."' 3 Rather than serving as a punishment for
individual officers that conduct illegal searches, the exclusionary rule
serves as an incentive for law enforcement officials to respect the
Fourth Amendment, because only by doing so will the evidence they
worked so hard to gather be admitted at trial.'°4 California, the only
state that allows searches of juveniles that would be illegal if con-
ducted in the same manner on an adult, 105 sends a message that its ju-
venile justice institution is free to promulgate polices that violate ju-
veniles' Fourth Amendment rights.
From the foregoing it is clear that the exclusionary rule serves a
number of important purposes beyond that of deterring police miscon-
duct. The exclusionary rule ensures that individuals' rights under the
Fourth Amendment are respected, promotes the integrity of the justice
system as a whole, and encourages the creation of institutional poli-
cies and behaviors that operate within Fourth Amendment mandates.
None of these essential purposes of the exclusionary rule can be
achieved in a state which arbitrarily allows searches of juveniles
which would be illegal if conducted on an adult. Therefore, Sanders'
holding, which draws a distinction between adults and juveniles,
should be corrected to treat both in an equal manner.
However, courts may continue to misstate the sole purpose of the
exclusionary rule as that of deterring police misconduct, as they did in
Sanders. As evidenced by the discussion below, even under such a
"deterrence" analysis the result is the same: Sanders should be ex-
tended to cover juveniles as well as adults.
103. Sanders, 73 P.3d at 507 (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 492 (1976)).
104. Stewart, supra note 95, at 1400.
105. Sanders, 73 P.3d at 503.
Our holding in Tyrell J. that police could justify a search based upon the existence
of a search condition of which they were unaware, received a chilly reception. Re-
ferring to our earlier decision in Martinez, one commentator stated: "Regrettably,
that eminently sound position was later abandoned in In re Tyrell J. on the bizarre
reasoning that a probationer who knows that he is subject to 'a valid search condi-
tion' to his release consequently 'does not have a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy over his person or property' vis-A-vis any search by anyone, including a
search by a police officer unaware of the probationer status! As the dissent in Ty-
rell J. aptly noted, that strange conclusion, without precedent in any jurisdiction,
gives police an incentive to make searches even without probable cause because,
should it turn out that the suspect is a probationer, the evidence will be admissible
nonetheless."
Id. (emphasis omitted) (internal citations omitted).
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IV. SANDERS AND KNIGHTS-SAY GOODNIGHT TO IN RE TYRELL J.
Any case involving illegal searches, where police later discover
search conditions they were unaware of at the time, is now bound by
the synthesis of holdings from Knights and Sanders. Under such an
analysis, officers' ignorance of the search condition at the time of the
search is a "salient circumstance" in determining whether a search is
unreasonable and, therefore, violates the Fourth Amendment. 106
Under Knights, in order to determine whether a search is reason-
able, the court looks to the "totality of the circumstances."'' 7 The ex-
istence of a search condition that is previously known to the officer is
a salient circumstance in such an analysis.'08 In Knights, the police of-
ficer knew the probationer was subject to a search condition,"°
whereas in Sanders, the officer did not." ' Sanders was the first case
to apply Knights' totality of the circumstances test to a search where
the officers were not aware of the search condition. Sanders specifi-
cally recognized the officer's lack of knowledge of the condition as a
second salient circumstance,' a circumstance that tips the scales in
the defendant's favor in deciding whether the search violated the
Fourth Amendment."' In the case of unknown search conditions, the
search cannot be deemed reasonable, because "if an officer is unaware
that a suspect is on probation' and subject to a search condition, the
search is not justified by the state's interest in supervising probation-
ers or by the concern that probationers are more likely to commit
criminal acts."' 1 3 Later California cases apply the same analysis, fo-
cusing on the officer's lack of knowledge of a search condition as a
second "salient circumstance" in deciding to exclude evidence. 114
In re Tyrell J. was decided seven years before Knights and nine
years before Sanders; therefore, neither was binding upon that case.
However, the synthesis of Sanders with Knights compels one to con-
clude that under the Fourth Amendment, an otherwise unlawful search
may not be justified by a search condition of which police were un-
106. Id. at 506.
107. United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118 (2001).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 115.
110. Sanders, 73 P.3d at 498.
111. "In order to determine whether the search was unlawful as to McDaniel, we must
examine 'the totality of the circumstances,' with two salient circumstances being McDaniel's
parole search condition and the officer's lack of knowledge of that condition." Id. at 506.
112. See id. at 507.
113. Id.
114. See People v. Hill, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 719, 723 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
47320051
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aware when the search was conducted, whether the subject of the
search was an adult or a juvenile.
V. THE EQUAL PROTECTION ARGUMENT FOR EXTENDING SANDERS TO
COVER JUVENILES
Allowing juvenile probationers to be searched by officers absent
knowledge of a search condition violates juveniles' fundamental right
to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. In practice, Sand-
ers creates two classes of persons for Fourth Amendment purposes:
(1) adults, whose search condition the police must have knowledge of
before a search is conducted, and (2) juveniles, who may be searched
without such knowledge. The latter class is denied the assistance of
the exclusionary rule. This classification is invalid and violates the
Fourteenth Amendment.
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment pro-
vides that "[n]o state shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdic-
tion the equal protection of the laws." '115 The Fourteenth Amendment
prohibits the unequal treatment of different "classes of individuals
who are similarly situated."'1 6 In analyzing a challenge under the
Equal Protection Clause, the U.S. Supreme Court has adopted differ-
ent levels of scrutiny depending upon the nature of the classification at
issue." 7 Denials of fundamental rights to a group of persons are sub-
ject to a strict scrutiny level of analysis." 8 Other classifications are
subject to a rational basis standard of review." 9
A. Strict Scrutiny Test
The right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures is a
fundamental liberty interest, 20 and as such is subject to a strict scru-
tiny analysis. Thus, the government cannot infringe upon the funda-
mental right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, nor
can it apply law unequally between adults and juveniles. Yet the di-
chotomy created by the rulings in Tyrell J. and Sanders creates such a
115. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
116. 28 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 12 (1994).
117. RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 18.3
(3d ed. 1999).
118. People v. Olivas, 551 P.2d 375, 379 (Cal. 1976).
119. Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 13 (1988).
120. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949), overruled on other grounds by Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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result. Under Sanders, the illegal search of a juvenile, which if con-
ducted in the same manner on an adult would trigger the suppression
of evidence found in that search, may result in that juvenile's incar-
ceration. Because juveniles and adults are treated differently with re-
spect to the fundamental right to be free from unreasonable searches
and seizures, California's failure to extend Sanders to cover juveniles
is subject to a strict scrutiny analysis. Under strict scrutiny, a law will
be upheld only if the state can prove that it is necessary to achieve a
compelling purpose. 2 '
Therefore, the proper inquiry is whether California has a compel-
ling reason to disregard the fundamental Fourth Amendment rights of
juvenile probationers. The California Court of Appeals has already
passed on this issue in People v. Hester.122 In Hester, police stopped a
vehicle carrying three adults and one juvenile.'23 Lacking reasonable
suspicion for the stop, 24 the government relied on the later discovery
that the juvenile and two of the adults were on probation. 125 The court
rejected this reasoning and held that the probation conditions could
not be used to justify the illegal search, because the reasonableness of
the search is based on the facts known to the officer at the time he
acts.2 6  While the court in Hester based its decision on Fourth
Amendment principles, the court also sent an invitation to those mak-
ing an equal protection argument: "In the absence of compelling rea-
sons to treat individuals subject to the juvenile law differently than
adults, we feel compelled by Sanders to limit Tyrell J. to its facts.
127
If the California Court of Appeals believes there are "no compelling
reasons" to allow the after-acquired knowledge of a juvenile search
condition to justify an illegal search, it is unlikely that continued reli-
ance on Tyrell J. will withstand a strict scrutiny analysis.
B. Rational Basis Test
All laws challenged under equal protection must, at a minimum,
survive rational basis scrutiny. 128 When analyzing an equal protection
121. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 645 (2d ed.
2002).
122. 14 Cal. Rptr. 3d 377 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
123. Id. at 381.
124. Id. at 387.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 393 (citing People v. Sanders, 73 P.3d 496, 507 (Cal. 2003)).
127. Id. at 398 (emphasis added).
128. 28 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 13 (1994).
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issue under the rational basis test, "the classification must be reason-
able, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference hav-
ing a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation so that
all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike."' 29 In short, under
a rational basis review a law must be related to a legitimate govern-
ment purpose.
Despite the denouncement of the model thirty years earlier by the
U.S. Supreme Court in Gault, ' 30 the California District Attorneys As-
sociation submitted an amicus curiae brief to the Sanders court citing
continuing support for parens patriae as a primary reason not to ex-
tend the Sanders rule to juveniles.'31 The Sanders court cited that
brief along with its decision to sidestep the issue of whether to extend
the rule to juveniles.132 Thus, the proper inquiry should be whether
California's reliance on parens patriae as a justification to deny juve-
niles equal protection under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments is
legitimate.'
The legitimacy of the policy of "rehabilitating youngsters" is im-
possible to examine without including the context of current events.
A juvenile incarcerated under California law is detained in the Cali-
fornia Youth Authority (CYA),M "a system that has been widely ma-
ligned for its violence, substandard healthcare and failure to steer
wayward youths toward a law-abiding future."'35 In November 2004,
Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger intervened in a lawsuit lodged
against the CYA by Margaret Farrell, whose nephew, a mentally ill
CYA inmate, was locked in his cell for 23 hours a day and fed
"blender meals"'136 through a straw from outside his cell. 137  CYA's
many controversies include holding inmates in cages during school-
ing, guards kicking and striking inmates while they lay prostrate on
the floor, and instances of inmates committing suicide as part of a
129. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
130. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1967).
131. People v. Sanders, 73 P.3d 496, 508 n.5. (Cal. 2003).
132. Id.
133. The Supreme Court has ruled that under certain circumstances the liberty interests of
juveniles may "be subordinated to the State's 'parens patriae interest."' See Schall v. Martin,
467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984). However, in no case has the U.S. Supreme Court ruled a juvenile
probationer has no reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment.
134. See In re Tyrell J., 876 P.2d 519, 527 (Cal. 1994).
135. Jennifer Warren, State Youth Prisons on Road to Rehab, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2004,
at Al.
136. Id. Blender meals consist of "a whipped mix of food groups." Id.
137. Id.
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pact.'38 In his notes related to the Farrell lawsuit, Schwarzenegger
stated that the agreement to settle the lawsuit will "put the [CYA's]
focus back on rehabilitation.' ' 39 -Such a comment begs the question: If
CYA's focus needs to be put back on rehabilitation, where was it be-
fore?
If California's system for housing juvenile detainees was not fo-
cused on rehabilitation, how can parens patriae, a doctrine whose fo-
cus "embraces a goal of rehabilitating youngsters"' 4 be relied upon to
strip juveniles of their fundamental rights? It cannot. Parens patriae,
in the form practiced in California and particularly by the CYA, has
lost the legitimacy necessary to support disparate treatment under the
Equal Protection Clause. Thus, even under the rational basis test, al-
lowing juveniles to be searched in a manner that would be illegal if
practiced on an adult is a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's
Equal Protection Clause.
VI. CONCLUSION
The rule announced in People v. Sanders, where the reasonable-
ness of a warrantless search of an adult probationer on a search condi-
tion depends on the officer's knowledge at the time of the search,
should be extended to juveniles as well, thus overturning Tyrell J.
The reasoning in that case is wholly obsolete, given its reliance on the
parens patriae model. Furthermore, failure to extend Sanders to ju-
veniles is inconsistent with the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in
Knights. Extending Sanders to its logical conclusion would eliminate
constitutionally unsupportable conflicts in legal reasoning put forth by
the same court in Tyrell J. and Sanders. It would discourage, rather
than encourage, police misconduct by eliminating the incentive to
conduct illegal searches in hopes that the search could be later legiti-
mized by the discovery of a search condition. The Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment compels the use of legitimate
processes before conducting searches because disparate treatment of
juveniles' Fourth Amendment rights is untenable under either a strict
scrutiny analysis or the much more relaxed rational basis review. Fi-
nally, overturning Tyrell J. will send a message that the rights of juve-
niles are respected, valued members' of society, and will reduce the
138. Id. At the lone prison near Sacramento, wards Deon Whitfield and Durrell Feaster
"hanged themselves with bedsheets in the isolation cell they shared." Id.
139. Id.
140. See People v. Sanders, 73 P.3d 496, 502 (Cal. 2003).
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cynicism shared by urban youth toward the police. Consider our
friend Earnest: "A child arrested without valid reason by a seemingly
all-powerful and challengeless exercise of police power would in-
stantly intuit the injustice and react accordingly. Even a juvenile who
has violated the law but is unfairly arrested will feel deceived and thus
resist any rehabilitative efforts."' 41 At its next possible opportunity,
either the California legislature or the California Supreme Court
should take action and find the reasonableness of a search, whether
conducted on an adult or a juvenile, shall be determined by the cir-
cumstances known to the police officer at the time of the search.
Kurt A. Weiser*
141. Lanes v. Texas, 767 S.W.2d 789,795 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).
* J.D. Candidate, California Western School of Law, 2006; B.A., University of Cali-
fornia, Santa Cruz, 1995. 1 would like to thank Professors Roake and Benner for their excel-
lent ideas, assistance, and encouragement. And of course, I could not have done this without
Lizzie's support.
478 [Vol. 41
20
California Western Law Review, Vol. 41 [2004], No. 2, Art. 5
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol41/iss2/5
